JunoFleet Privacy Policy
Effective date: November 1, 2026
The short version
- JunoFleet lets you control coding agents on your own computer from your phone or desktop through our relay server.
- The content of your sessions (prompts, replies, commands, approvals, files and agent-to-agent messages) is encrypted on your own devices with keys we never have before it reaches our relay. We cannot decrypt it. The relay does see and keep some information about your sessions, such as identifiers, timing and agent names; section 2 lists it.
- What we do hold is account and device information: your Google or Apple account identifier and email address, your devices' public keys, your passkey's credential identifier and public key, push tokens, the names you give your agents, and delivery records for notifications and agent messages.
- Our servers are in Amazon Web Services' Seoul region (Korea). On the website, payments in Korea are handled by Toss Payments (토스페이먼츠) for us, and payments elsewhere by Polar, which resells JunoFleet as the seller; in the app, by Apple or Google. Push notifications are delivered by Apple and Google.
- We do not sell personal data, we do not run advertising, and the apps contain no analytics or tracking SDK.
- You can delete your account in the app and on the website. Some records remain for the limited purposes and periods in section 3.
The rest of this policy gives the details that the Korean Personal Information Protection Act (개인정보 보호법) and the app stores require.
1. Who is responsible
JunoFleet (주노플릿) (SEONGMIN KIM), 2F 125, 75 Neungdong-ro 13-gil, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul, 05015, Republic of Korea, business registration 155-12-03275, is the controller of the personal data described here ("we").
Privacy officer (개인정보 보호책임자): SEONGMIN KIM (representative). Contact: contact@junofleet.com, +82 10-3049-1189.
This policy covers the JunoFleet relay service, the JunoFleet apps (iPhone, iPad, Android, macOS, Windows), the host software that runs on your computer, and the junofleet.com website. It does not cover the AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI and others) whose agents you run; their own terms and privacy policies apply to what you send them.
2. What we collect, why, and on what basis
Korean law lets us process data that is needed to provide the service you signed up for without asking for a separate consent (개인정보 보호법 Art. 15(1)4). We ask for consent only where the law requires it, and we mark those items.
2.1 Account
| Data | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Google or Apple account identifier (issuer and subject) | To sign you in and tell your account from others | Contract |
| Your verified email address from Google, or the address Apple gives us (which may be an Apple relay address if you choose to hide your email) | To identify your account, send receipts, security alerts and notices about these terms | Contract |
| Account role and creation time | To run your account | Contract |
| For accounts created with Sign in with Apple: a refresh token from Apple, stored encrypted (erased when you delete your account) | So that when you delete your account we can tell Apple to end JunoFleet's access to your Apple sign-in | Contract |
| Deletion-code checks: for each of your eight deletion codes, a one-way scrambled value (an Argon2id hash with its salt and settings), the number of the code set, and whether each code has been used; never the codes themselves | So that you can request deletion of your account with a code if you lose every device; they can be used for nothing else | Contract |
| Deletion requests: when a deletion was requested, the date it is due, its state (waiting, cancelled or completed), which device cancelled it, and when a wrong code was entered | To run the 7-day wait, let your devices cancel, and answer questions about whether and when a deletion was requested or done | Contract, security |
We have no password for you: JunoFleet never asks for, stores or resets a password, and you recover access through Google or Apple. From Google we receive only your email and whether Google has verified it; we do not receive your Google name, profile photo or contacts. We use Google Sign-In data only as described here, in line with the Google API Services User Data Policy, including its Limited Use requirements. From Apple (Sign in with Apple) we receive an account identifier and the email address you choose to share, which can be an Apple relay address that forwards to you; we do not request your name.
2.2 Devices and hosts
| Data | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Public keys of each device and host you enrol (signing and key-agreement keys) | To let your devices prove who they are and encrypt to each other; the matching private keys stay in your device's secure hardware or key store and never reach us | Contract |
| Device kind (phone/desktop or host), trust and control flags, enrolment time | To decide which of your devices may control which of your hosts | Contract |
| Signed device-directory statements (your own devices' signatures over the list above) | To give you a tamper-evident history of which devices were added or removed | Contract, security |
| Passkey credential identifier and binding time (2FA) | To verify your second factor when you enrol a device or change protections | Contract, security |
| Passkey public key and whether the passkey can be backed up (backup-eligible flag) | So your devices and computers can check your 2FA confirmations; the public key is also written into the signed device directory | Contract, security |
| 2FA confirmations attached to device-directory changes: the passkey's signature over the change, with the authenticator data and client data it signed | So every device can check the 2FA confirmation for changes that require one | Contract, security |
| Short-lived 2FA ceremony state | To complete a 2FA confirmation in progress; valid for minutes | Contract |
| Last time each host connected | To show you whether your computer is online | Contract |
These are public-key material and signatures, not biometric data. We do not store device names, hostnames, your passkey's private key, biometric data, or anything about how your phone unlocked. Your phone's screen lock (fingerprint, face or PIN) is checked by your phone, not by us.
2.3 Sessions, messages and notifications
| Data | Can we read it? | Why we hold it | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Session identifiers, key epochs and sequence numbers | Yes (identifiers only) | To route traffic and stop replayed messages | Contract |
| Session metadata (agent, folder, provider, label, mode, status) and session keys wrapped to your devices | No, encrypted | To let your devices join a session | Contract |
| Notification bodies (what an agent wants to tell you) | No, encrypted | To deliver notifications to your devices | Contract |
| Notification delivery records: an identifier, a hash of the encrypted request, time, outcome | Identifiers only | To avoid duplicate delivery and to show delivery problems | Contract |
| Agent-to-agent messages queued for a host that is offline | No, encrypted | To deliver them when the host reconnects | Contract |
| Agent-message delivery outcomes (state, time, reason code) | Yes (codes only) | To tell the sender what happened | Contract |
| Names you give your agents, linked to the host they run on | Yes | To route agent-to-agent messages by name; choose names that are not personal | Contract |
| Short-lived hashes of each message (about 5 minutes) | Hash only | To reject replayed messages | Security |
Prompts, agent replies, commands, file paths, tool approvals and their answers, attachments and the text of agent-to-agent messages are encrypted end to end under keys that exist only on your devices and your host. The relay forwards them and cannot open them. Attachments pass through the relay to your host and are not stored by us. Tool-approval decisions are recorded, encrypted, on your own computer; we hold no copy.
2.4 Push notifications
| Data | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Push token issued to your app by Apple (APNs) or Google (FCM) | To wake your app when something needs your attention | Contract |
Push notifications are delivered through Apple (APNs) or Google (FCM). The detailed title, text, agent name and similar contents of an ordinary session notification are encrypted so that only your app can open them; Apple and Google cannot read that encrypted body. The broad category (ordinary notification, security alert or transfer notice) and delivery information are visible to the relevant push provider. Ordinary notifications include notification, computer and session identifiers, the encryption-key version, a server-assigned sequence number and a follow-up flag. Transfer notices include their kind, allowance-pool category, threshold (80 % or 100 %), included allowance and next reset time in plain form. The provider also processes the receiving device's push token, app-identifying information, delivery priority and an identifier used to group repeated notifications. Apple additionally receives a fixed display title ("JunoFleet" or "Security alert"), interruption level, sound and display-processing settings. Google receives notification data and delivery priority; the app builds the displayed notification.
2.5 Billing
| Data | Who holds it | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Website purchases from us (billing country Korea): for each charge, refund or cancellation, the amount, its supply value and VAT, the time, the period and product, the card company and masked card number as Toss Payments returns them, and any 현금영수증 status; for a Business purchase, also the business registration number, company name, representative and billing email you enter | Our billing records; Toss Payments processes the payment for us | To charge you, issue receipts, handle refunds and file Korean VAT | Contract, legal obligation |
| Website purchases through Polar (billing country outside Korea): name, email, country, tax identifiers you give at checkout, invoices | Polar, as the seller; we receive the subscription status, period and product, and an order or subscription identifier | So that Polar can sell to you and collect tax, and so that we can give your account the subscription you bought | Contract |
| Payment card or bank account number | Toss Payments or Polar only; for recurring charges from us, Toss Payments gives us a billing key, which we store encrypted and never send to any app. For the exceptional refund account, see 'Refund account' below | To process payments | Contract |
| Refund account (exceptional cases only): the account holder, bank and account number you send once when a card payment can no longer be cancelled and the payment provider offers no refund method | Us; never stored in the account database and deleted as soon as the transfer is made. Only the fact of the transfer (amount, date, bank name) is kept as a payment record for 5 years (Korean E-Commerce Act Enforcement Decree, Art. 6) | Making that refund transfer | Performing the contract (our refund duty) |
| Subscriptions bought in the app: from Apple or Google, the subscription identifier (Apple's original transaction ID; the Google purchase token and its hash), the product ID, the state (active, grace period, expired or revoked), the end of the current period, and the identifier and time of each change notice. To verify a purchase and its account binding, we also process individual transaction identifiers, app and environment information, transaction/renewal/revocation times and an account-link identifier, as applicable. At purchase, the store receives our account identifier (Apple) or a value derived from it (Google); we compare the returned value. These verification fields are not additionally stored as separate records beyond the billing records described above. | Apple (App Store) or Google (Google Play), and our billing records | To give your account the subscription you bought and keep its status current | Contract, legal obligation |
| Transfer records: monthly transfer per device and per type (conversation, files, agent messages), and credit purchases and use. No content | Our usage records | Metering the included allowance and credits, notices, refunds | Contract |
We do not receive your card number from Apple or Google, and we never see your full card number. From Toss Payments we receive payment and order identifiers, payment status and time, amounts and tax breakdowns, the card-company code, a partially masked card number and receipt information. In our payment records we keep only the masked suffix after removing its leading digits. For purchases through Polar, Polar is the seller; to apply the subscription to your account we receive and keep the subscription status, the end of the current period, whether it is set to cancel at period end, and the account link identifier.
2.6 Website and support
| Data | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Emails you send to contact@junofleet.com and our replies | To help you and to handle complaints | Contract, legal obligation |
| Website server logs (IP address, time, page, browser type): request logs processed by Cloudflare; we do not store our own copy | To keep the website running and detect attacks | Legitimate interest (GDPR) / Art. 15(1)6 (Korea) |
| Cookies: the language cookie (lang) and the account-page sign-in cookies | Only strictly necessary cookies for sign-in to your account page; no advertising or analytics cookies | Contract |
2.7 Technical records on the relay
Security records. They contain no session content, prompts, commands or file paths.
| Data | Why | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Security events: a passkey was added or removed, a device or computer asked to join your account, and refused sign-in attempts (with the reason and a count), each with the device and time | Shown to you in the app's security tab; used to investigate abuse | Contract, security |
| Refused sign-in counters per device and reason, with the first and last time | To turn repeated refusals into one security event without unbounded growth | Security |
| Security alerts from your own computers: a record of each alert (whether it raised an alarm, a fingerprint of the request, time), which also stops the same alert being delivered twice, and an encrypted copy for each of your devices | To deliver your computers' security alerts to your devices once; we cannot read the encrypted copies | Contract, security |
Sign-in and connection log: for each attempt to sign a device or computer in to the relay, and for each relay connection it opens and closes, we record the outcome (accepted, or refused with the reason code), the device identifier, the client address as the relay saw it, the client software version, and the time. A refused attempt whose signature could not be checked is marked as unverified, because its account and device identifiers are then only what the request claimed. The log never contains the signed request, a credential, a token or any content.
| Data | Where | How long | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Your IP address and request rate, for admission control | Relay memory; the relay program does not write it to its own logs. The address is also written to the sign-in and connection log above, as a row of that log | Up to 24 hours in memory; see the log's retention in section 3 | To limit abusive connection attempts |
| Relay application logs | Amazon CloudWatch (Seoul) | 14 days | Operations; the relay program's own log lines name failing components and contain no account data. Other components that write to the same log group during the test period (the network tunnel) may record IP addresses; these logs are also deleted automatically after 14 days. |
| Automated database backups | Amazon RDS (Seoul), encrypted | 7 days | Recovery |
2.8 Optional items that need your consent
| Data | Why | How to withdraw |
|---|---|---|
| Security alerts by email | Only if you turn it on in the app | Turn it off in the app |
2.9 Features you may enable that send data to a third party yourself
If you turn on the optional risk-scoring guard for agent messages and enter your own TypeSafe AI (Jev) API key, your host sends the text of incoming agent messages to TypeSafe AI for scoring. That transfer happens from your computer under your own account with that provider, not through us. The app tells you this before you enable it.
Likewise, what your agents send to Anthropic, OpenAI or another AI provider is governed by your contract with that provider. We never see or relay your provider credentials.
2.10 What we never collect
Resident registration numbers, phone-number identity verification, precise or approximate location, contacts, photos (other than attachments you send through the encrypted channel), advertising identifiers, biometric data, analytics or usage tracking.
3. How long we keep data
| Data | Retention |
|---|---|
| Account, active passkey registration (credential identifier, public key, backup-eligible flag), agent names, Apple refresh token (erased when you delete your account) | Until you delete your account; then deleted within 5 business days |
| Push tokens | Until the device deletes its token, the device is removed, or the account is deleted. Removing a device deletes its push tokens at the same time |
| Device and host public keys, signed device-directory statements, and the passkey credential ids, public keys, backup-eligible flags and 2FA confirmations written into or stored with them | For the life of the account; removing a device adds a signed "removed" entry rather than erasing the earlier ones. Deleted with your account, unless an open abuse case names them |
| Encrypted session metadata and wrapped keys | Until your host closes the session |
| Encrypted notifications and queued agent-message bodies | Deleted by the scheduled job after the selected retention period or message delivery deadline, each no more than seven days. |
| Notification duplicate-prevention records | For the life of the account; deleted with it |
| Agent-message processing status and outcomes | After the delivery deadline, deleted by the scheduled job once the sending computer has acknowledged the final result. Unacknowledged results are also deleted by that job once 30 days have passed after the deadline; deleted with the account |
| Security events | 90 days; deleted by a scheduled job once the period has passed |
| Refused sign-in counters | Until they are turned into a security event, then as above |
| Encrypted copies of your computers' security alerts | 90 days; deleted by a scheduled job once the period has passed |
| Records of your computers' security alerts | For the life of the account, like notification delivery records, because they stop duplicate delivery |
| 2FA ceremony state | Valid for minutes; an expired ceremony is removed when the next one starts or completes |
| Deletion-code checks | For the life of the account, deleted with it. A used code, and every code of a replaced or cancelled set, stops working at once |
| Deletion requests | 1 year after the request ends: when the deletion is completed, or when the request is cancelled; a wrong-code record with no request, the same period from that attempt |
| Sign-in and connection log with IP address | 12 months; deleted by a scheduled job once the period has passed, and with your account when you delete it unless an open abuse case names the rows |
| Replay-protection hashes | About 5 minutes |
| Relay logs / automated database backups | 14 days / 7 days |
| Final database snapshot taken when the production database is replaced | 30 days, after which it is deleted automatically (the hosting provider's backup service carries out the deletion within up to eight hours after the 30 days end) |
| Transfer records | Monthly account totals and the credit and refund records: 5 years (Korean E-Commerce Act Enforcement Decree, Art. 6); per-device detail: this and the previous month only |
| Refund account | Never stored in the account database; deleted as soon as the transfer is made. Only the fact of the transfer (amount, date, bank name) is kept as a payment record for 5 years (Korean E-Commerce Act Enforcement Decree, Art. 6) |
| Inactive accounts holding unused Apple-bought credit | Only the billing record and the credit balance are kept; other data is deleted on the normal schedule, and everything is deleted if you ask us to delete the account |
| Billing: contracts, cancellations, payments, supply records, including each charge, refund and cancellation from us and the Business buyer details above | 5 years after the transaction (전자상거래법 시행령 Art. 6) |
| Minimal records for payments and refunds still to be settled after account deletion (payment and subscription references, amount, period, and the email address for the refund notice) | Until every payment and subscription open at deletion is settled (so that a payment arriving after deletion can be refunded with a notice). Settled records are kept like the billing records above; the email address copied into each refund request or refund of an undelivered payment is destroyed as soon as that refund notice is sent |
| Complaint and dispute records | 3 years (same) |
| Price and promotion display records | 6 months (same) |
If an account has not been used and has had no paid or free period for 12 months, counted from the later of the last use and the end of the last paid or free period, we email you when those 12 months have passed and delete it, as if you had deleted it yourself, 30 days after that email unless you sign in before then. An account inside a paid period is never deleted this way.
Data kept under a legal duty after you leave is stored separately from active account data and used only for that duty.
How we destroy data
When a retention period ends or the purpose is achieved, we destroy the data without delay. Electronic files are deleted so that they cannot be recovered, and automated database backups expire on a 7-day cycle; a final snapshot of the production database, if kept, follows the period in the table above.
4. Who else receives your data
The companies below receive personal data so that we can run the service. Where a company acts only on our instructions, we entrust the work to it under a contract that requires security measures (개인정보 보호법 Art. 26). Some may act partly on their own account (for example Google for its own sign-in, or a payment processor for its own legal duties); their role for each flow is a processor acting for us as listed in the table above, except that Google and Apple sign-in and the payment processors' own legal duties are their own responsibility. None of them receives your session content from us in a form it can read.
| Company | Work | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services, Inc. | Hosting the relay, database, logs and backups (ap-northeast-2, Seoul) | Korea |
| Toss Payments Co., Ltd. (토스페이먼츠) | Processing card and bank payments, billing keys, refunds and cash receipts for purchases from us, under our instructions | Korea |
| Polar Software, Inc. | Selling website subscriptions and credits outside Korea as our reseller and merchant of record, charging, refunds, receipts and sales tax; partly on its own account as the seller | United States |
| Apple Inc., Google LLC (in-app subscriptions) | Selling and billing subscriptions bought in the app, and telling us their status | United States |
| Apple Inc. | Delivering push notifications to iPhone, iPad and Mac | United States |
| Google LLC | Sign-in (Google Identity); delivering push notifications to Android | United States |
| Apple Inc. (sign-in) | Sign in with Apple; forwarding email to Apple relay addresses | United States |
| Cloudflare, Inc. | Network edge and tunnel in front of the relay during the test period; email routing for our contact address | United States and global edge |
| Amazon Web Services, Inc. (SES) | Sending service and security emails | Korea |
We will update this table before adding or changing a processor.
5. Transfers outside Korea
Our relay and database are in Korea. The companies above that are outside Korea receive the following, as needed to perform your contract with us (개인정보 보호법 Art. 28-8(1)3, disclosed here instead of separate consent):
| Recipient and contact | Data | When and how | Their purpose and retention | How to refuse |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polar Software, Inc., privacy@polar.sh (only if your billing country is outside Korea) | Billing name, email, country, card details you enter, invoices; from us, your account's order reference | At checkout and each billing cycle, over encrypted connections | Selling, payment processing and tax as the seller; retention under its own policy and tax law | Customers in Korea buy from us through Toss Payments, so nothing goes to Polar |
| Apple Inc., Google LLC (push) | Push token and the push message (the encrypted body and the plain fields listed in section 2.4) | Each time a notification is sent | Delivery; retention under their own policy | Turn off notifications for JunoFleet in your phone's settings |
| Google LLC (sign-in) | Your Google sign-in request; we receive the identifier and email back | At each sign-in | Authentication under Google's policy | Sign in with Apple instead; this creates a separate account and does not give access to your Google-created account |
| Apple Inc. (sign-in) | Your Apple sign-in request; we receive the identifier and the email you share. If you hide your email, our emails to you pass through Apple's relay | At each sign-in, and for each email to a relay address | Authentication and email relay under Apple's policy | Sign in with Google instead; this creates a separate account and does not give access to your Apple-created account |
| Apple Inc., Google LLC (in-app subscriptions) | The subscription identifier, product ID, state and period end, and our account identifier (Apple) or a value derived from it (Google), when we check or receive a subscription's status | At purchase, at each renewal and when Apple or Google notifies a change | Selling and billing the subscription; retention under their own policy | Subscribe on the website instead |
| Cloudflare, Inc. | Connection metadata (IP address, TLS details) at the network edge; it cannot read frame content | Each connection during the test period | Traffic routing and attack mitigation; short-term logs under its policy | None while the test-period edge is in use |
We never send these companies your session content in a form they can read. Your session content does go, readable, to the AI provider your agent uses, and to any optional service you switch on (section 2.9); those flows run from your computer under your own contracts with them.
For users in the European Economic Area or the United Kingdom: JunoFleet is not offered in the European Economic Area or the United Kingdom.
6. Deleting your data
- You can request account deletion in the app or on the website. Ordinary account information is deleted within five business days after account deletion. Transaction records retained by law, and security/deletion records and backups with separate retention periods specified in section 3, are kept for those purposes and periods and then deleted.
- Remove a device: revoke it in the app. It can no longer connect or receive notifications at once. Removing a device is not the same as erasing its data: its public key stays in the signed device directory as a record that it was removed, and its push token stays stored until token deletion on removal is built.
- Local data (session history, settings, keys) lives on your own devices and computer; deleting your account does not touch it. Delete it with the app's uninstall instructions.
- Deletion is irreversible; we cannot recover an account or its device directory.
- Losing devices is different from deleting the account. Keep a second device enrolled, for example the JunoFleet app on your computer, with its own verification set up. If you lose a device, remove it from another of your devices and add a new one; removing a lost device stops its future access but cannot erase what is already stored on it. If you lose every enrolled device, JunoFleet cannot restore access in your existing setup, even if a computer with JunoFleet still runs; you would start again with a new setup, and files on that computer may still be there. Google or Apple can help you recover your sign-in, but our servers hold no secret that can stand in for your devices. You may delete your account with a deletion code as described in the next point.
- Deletion codes: when you set up two-factor verification, the app shows you eight deletion codes once. If you lose every device, signing in with the Google or Apple account that owns your account and entering one unused code asks us to delete your account. We alert your enrolled devices and your email, then wait 7 days, and any device still enrolled can cancel. We keep only a scrambled check for each code (section 2.1), which can be used only to delete your account. Without a device or a code you cannot delete your account yourself; you can still contact us about your rights, and an inactive account is handled as described in section 3. Deleting your account does not erase copies on lost computers, and it does not stop an Apple subscription (Terms 7.3).
- Before you sell, recycle or hand over a computer that ran JunoFleet, remove it from your account from another device and erase its storage, including any backups of it. Removing it stops new access; it does not erase what is already on its disk. JunoFleet cannot wipe a computer remotely.
7. Your rights
You can, at any time: see what we hold about you; correct it; delete it; ask us to pause processing; object to processing we do on the basis of our legitimate interests, where that basis applies to you; withdraw a consent you gave; and get a copy of your account data in a machine-readable form where the law gives you that right. In the app you can view your devices and delete your account. For everything else write to contact@junofleet.com; we answer within 10 days. If you are a child, your parent or legal representative can exercise these rights for you.
We make no decisions about you by automated means alone. Rate limiting by IP address and signature failures block connections automatically, but any action against an account is reviewed by a person.
If you are unhappy with our answer you can complain to the Personal Information Protection Commission (privacy.go.kr, 182 from Korea), the Korea Internet & Security Agency privacy centre (118), or, if you are in the EU or UK, to your local supervisory authority.
8. How we protect your data
- End-to-end encryption (AES-256-GCM) of session content, notification text and agent messages with keys created on your host and shared only with your own devices. The relay is designed never to hold a session key.
- Device and host keys kept in secure hardware (Secure Enclave, TPM, Android hardware keystore) where the device has one, with the app showing when a key is software-only.
- Two-factor verification with a passkey for adding devices, changing protections and starting control. Your computers check it themselves; for device-directory changes every device that applies the change checks it, and the relay checks it first.
- Each account's rows are isolated in the database by enforced row-level security; the database and backups are encrypted; operator access uses short-lived identity federation with no long-lived keys.
- If personal data is breached we notify affected users within 72 hours and report to the authorities as Korean law requires.
- A compromised computer running as the same user as your agents can change JunoFleet's own protections on that machine. Our protections are designed for threats from outside that machine; no security measure is complete.
9. Children
JunoFleet is not for children under 14. We do not knowingly process their data; if you believe a child under 14 has an account, tell us and we will delete it.
10. Requests from authorities
We disclose account or connection records only when a legally binding order under Korean law requires it (a court permission under the Protection of Communications Secrets Act or a warrant). We hold some session data only in encrypted form and never hold the keys, so we cannot provide decrypted session content; we may be required to provide the encrypted data and the metadata we hold. We tell you about a request unless the law forbids it.
11. Business (company) accounts
When your company pays for your seat, the company administrator can see administrative metadata about the company channel: who connected when, from which device, which devices are enrolled, and policy settings. The administrator cannot read your session content, enrol devices on your computer, or control your sessions; JunoFleet's design does not give administrators those powers. Your company is responsible for the data it holds about you as your employer.
12. Changes to this policy
We post changes here with a new effective date and keep earlier versions available. We notify you by email and in the app at least 7 days before a change takes effect, and at least 30 days before a change that reduces your rights or adds new uses of your data; where the law requires your agreement we ask for it.
Version history
- November 1, 2026: first version.